Is Page and Post Restriction safe? Known vulnerabilities and latest version

The Page and Post Restriction plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.6.1 This is due to the `papr_restrict_page_post_rest_api()` function, hooked on `rest_pre_dispatch`, re-authenticating the current user from the `wordpress_logged_in` cookie via `wp_set_current_user()` for any GET or HEAD REST request where the current user is 0, without verifying a REST nonce — silently undoing the nonce-zeroing that WordPress core's `rest_cookie_check_errors()` performs on cookie-authenticated requests that lack an `X-WP-Nonce` header or `_wpnonce` parameter. Combined with WordPress's permissive REST CORS behavior — which echoes the request `Origin` and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` — this allows an unauthenticated attacker to read REST API GET responses as a logged-in victim, exposing role-restricted and private post/page content, victim user profile data via `/wp-json/wp/v2/users/me`, and comments the victim is authorized to see. This requires the attacker to lure a logged-in user into visiting an attacker-controlled page that issues credentialed cross-origin `fetch` requests against the target site's REST API; no nonce or further victim interaction beyond the page visit is needed.

Missing Authorization vulnerability in miniOrange Page Restriction WordPress (WP) page-and-post-restriction allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Page Restriction WordPress (WP): from n/a through 1.6.1.

Missing Authorization vulnerability in miniOrange Page Restriction WordPress (WP) page-and-post-restriction allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Page Restriction WordPress (WP): from n/a through 1.6.0.

The Page and Post Restriction plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in versions up to and including 1.4.0 via the WordPress core REST endpoints /wp-json/wp/v2/pages, /wp-json/wp/v2/pages/<id>, /wp-json/wp/v2/posts, and /wp-json/wp/v2/posts/<id>. This is due to the plugin's REST guards — papr_restrict_page_post_rest_api() and the the_posts filter registered by papr_filter_posts() — sourcing their restricted-ID list exclusively from papr_get_restricted_posts_id(), which only reads the per-page metabox options papr_allowed_redirect_for_pages and papr_allowed_redirect_for_posts and never consults the two global toggles papr_access_for_only_loggedin and papr_access_for_only_loggedin_posts that the plugin's own UI describes as 'Make all Pages Private' / 'Make all Posts Private'. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the full rendered content of every published page and post on sites configured with the documented global toggles, bypassing the security boundary enforced on the frontend by papr_restrict_logged_in_users().

The Page Restriction WordPress (WP) – Protect WP Pages/Post plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.6 via the WordPress core search feature. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract sensitive data from posts that have been restricted to higher-level roles such as administrator.

The Page Restriction WordPress (WP) – Protect WP Pages/Post plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to information disclosure in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.4. This is due to the plugin not properly restricting access to pages via the REST API when a page has been made private. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to view protected pages. The vendor has decided that they will not implement REST API protection on posts and pages and the restrictions will only apply to the front-end of the site. The vendors solution was to add notices throughout the dashboard and recommends installing the WordPress REST API Authentication plugin for REST API coverage.