Is MotoPress Appointment Booking safe? Known vulnerabilities and latest version

The MotoPress Appointment Booking WordPress plugin before 2.4.8 does not perform an authorization or ownership check when handling a user-supplied booking identifier on an unauthenticated endpoint, allowing unauthenticated attackers to permanently delete other users' reservations. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-9180: the deletion remains reachable on sites using payment confirmation, confirmed through version 2.4.7.

The MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.4. This is due to the `POST /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings` REST endpoint being registered with `'permission_callback' => '__return_true'`, allowing unauthenticated access, while the `createBooking` handler in `BookingsRestController.php` accepts an attacker-supplied `payment_details.booking_id` value and loads the referenced booking via `findById()` without verifying that the caller owns or has any rights to that booking. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the customer name, email address, phone number, and `customer_id` of any non-confirmed victim booking by submitting a request with no reservation items, causing `BookingService::createBooking()` to load the existing victim booking object and persist it with attacker-controlled customer data. Victim booking IDs can be harvested prior to exploitation without authentication by querying the also-publicly-accessible `GET /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings/reservations` endpoint with a guessable `service_id` and date range, and only bookings whose status is not `STATUS_CONFIRMED` (e.g., pending or auto-draft) are valid targets.

The MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 's' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.5 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. Exploitation requires the mpa_appointment_employee custom role, meaning any user assigned this role can perform the attack.